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The protection structures for the Floating Production 
Storage and Offloading (FPSO) caissons should be sufficiently 
strong to avoid contact with the caisson pipes even when 
the protection structure is damaged by the impact of the 
accompanying vessels. Collision events of protectors of 
appurtenances such as risers, mooring lines, and seawater lift 
caissons with supply vessel may cause structural damage to 
protection structures and even to the appurtenance structures 
and hull structures. This study introduces the collision impact 
analyses on three protective structures of FPSO against striking 
supply vessel whose displacement is 7,500 tons. The capacity 
of protection structures in view of strain energy has been 
assessed with simple beam FE models. The striking vessel has 
been modelled as a small rigid body, and impact simulation has 
been performed including material and geometric nonlinearities 
where ABAQUS Explicit tool, which is a commercial explicit code, 
has been used for non-linear collision analyses with protection 
structures. The results from the current work will be a guide to 
understanding the impact response of offshore structures and 
evaluation approaches, and will provide useful indications for the 
FPSO hull caisson protection design and operation. In addition, 
the findings obtained by the current study will be informative in 
the safe design of FPSO facilities.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Collision is a major threat to the safety of a ship or other 
offshore facilities and can result in significant economic damage, 
environmental pollution, and death. The main concern regarding 
ship collisions with offshore structures focuses mainly on the 
consequences. Because the cost of repairing the offshore structure 
is higher than that of the striking ship, a number of studies have 
focused on the method of increasing the crashworthiness of the 
offshore structure during accidental collision scenarios (ISSC 
2018).
These collision events could cause substantial damage to 
an offshore installation and, for a Floating Production Storage 
and Offloading (FPSO), the puncture of cargo tanks could result 
in significant spillage of hydrocarbons as well as the loss of life, 
disruption of safety functions and loss / delay of production. In 
certain situations, the damage may result in fire and explosions, 
or a significant structural failure leading to the FPSO's total loss.
FPSO vessel is the dominant unit for floating offshore oil 
and gas field production. FPSOs are efficient deep-water and 
ultra-deep-water production facilities and their key benefit is the 
ability to store and process the hydrocarbons.
Wang and Pedersen (2007) reviewed the work and analyses 
relating to ship-FPSO collision risk assessment. The emphasis 
was on the current requirements, FPSO collision occurrence, 
FPSO collision design scenarios, collision dynamics, impacts 
and acceptance requirements. The study developments of the 
collision and grounding of the ships have been implemented 
since the 1990s. Issues unique to ship-FPSO collisions have been 
addressed which deserve further development.
Ozguc (2015) evaluated the collision strength of Semi-
Submersible type CPF (Central Processing Facility) riser safety 
frame (RPF) and protection net (PN) supports. The PRF and PN 
supports are evaluated for their collision capacity when a supply 
vessel collides with them. It was estimated that the vessel 
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colliding from the north side is 18,000 tons and the one colliding 
from the east / west side was considered as 7,000 tonnes in 
accordance with the NORSOK N-004 code. The paper focused 
on general methodology and design of CPF accident scenarios 
using more sophisticated tools such as the non-linear FEM which 
predicts more accurately the structural responses during and 
after a collision. There were two separate designs for the supports 
for RPF and PN and, thus, there are four systems such as RPF-01, 
RPF-02, PN-01, and PN-02 respectively. The estimated kinetic 
energy from the North side was 20MJ for the collision. The east / 
west side of the collision energy was 14MJ for side collision, and 
11MJ for bow / stern collision. Collision energy and plastic stress 
parameters were employed to predict the collision capacities 
of the RPF and PN supports for the specified collision energies 
along the period of the structures.
Cho et al. (2017) introduced the structural design method, 
and non-linear commercial packages were used for the analysis 
of collisions. Non-linear collision analyses using commercial 
software tools, however, were time-consuming and costly to run, 
particularly during the initial design stage. Within the analysis, the 
first use of collision test results on single pipes and H-shape pipes 
was conducted to substantiate the adopted commercial package. 
Afterwards, a detailed parametric analysis was carried out by 
modifying the variables of design. A basic analytical expression 
was extracted assuming the striking vessel's kinetic energy had 
been dissipated by plastic pipe elongation and plastic hinges 
rotation. Using the results of the parametric analysis, design 
equations were obtained for calculating the maximum deflection 
and overall bending damage which could consider the effects of 
local denting and dynamic behaviour. In addition, an equation 
was also developed to determine the degree of local damage 
to the denting. The established technique was substantiated 
numerically using the expected magnitude of the damage to a 
real protection structure.
Ning et al. (2013) developed numerical methods to assess 
the structural integrity of a generic Spar hull in collision with a 
large supply vessel and to expose its progressive characteristics 
of the collision damage. The analysis of dynamic and non-linear 
finite elements is carried out for two collision scenarios using 
ABAQUS / Explicit tool, respectively. One was a practical simulation 
where the impact kinetic energy controlled by an initial velocity 
of impact and a ship's total mass during the collision was slowly 
depleted. The other was a simpler theoretical approach where 
a ship bow's impact velocity was constant during the collision, 
or the total impact energy was infinite. Progressive collision 
damages of the hull structures were accurately recorded for 
structural integrity evaluation using a combination of optimized 
material progressive damage models and Mises plasticity.
Hagen (2018) studied the collision damage in the 
Sevan 1000 FPSO when subjected to impacts from a 150,000 
deadweight tonnage shuttle tanker and two types of supply 
vessels. The emphasis was on the shuttle tanker impacts. The 
objective was to determine energy dissipation involved in the 
drive-off impacts, and to study the relative strength and the 
local structural response in both the striking ship and the struck 
FPSO. The impact scenarios were defined by upper limit drive-
off velocities and drafts corresponding to the initial and final 
offloading phase. Both head-on and glancing (non-central) 
impacts were studied for each scenario. A finite element model 
of the Sevan 1000 FPSO was created in the software Sesam GeniE 
and imported into the numerical code LS-DYNA for non-linear 
finite element analysis.
Ju and Jang (2019) evaluated the crashworthiness of the 
striking vessel and the struck vessel when the collision occurs 
because it can cause severe consequences. In this study, a 
simplified method was suggested for small-scale ship collision 
event and compared with the solution obtained from the finite 
element method. The shapes of the striking vessel and struck 
vessel were selected as a bow (bulbous bow and stem) and a 
double hulled structure respectively. From the finite element 
results it was confirmed that the stem case was more vulnerable 
than the bulbous bow case because its sharp shape could cause 
the local failure of struck vessel much earlier. 
Ozguc (2019) focused on the general approach and design 
of FPSO accident scenarios using more advanced methods such as 
the non-linear FEM used in order to provide structural responses 
during and after a collision. Due to the various collision scenarios 
and impact energy levels, the degree of FPSO hull damage was 
assessed using the criteria found in the NORSOK Standard. The 
accident case of 5 years on-site setting was accounted for the 
Accidental Limit State (ALS). The different collision scenarios 
were described as supply vessel collision bow on, supply vessel 
collision side on, supply vessel collision stern on, and take tanker 
collision bow on off. Conservatively, the impacting vessel during 
the collision (full energy consumed by the FPSO) was deemed 
non-deforming. Damage assessment to FPSO hull, including 
foundations for flare and flares, aft muster station, offloading 
reel and piping, and safety of green water above cargo deck, was 
investigated
The objective of this study is to carry out the collision impact 
analyses on three protective structures of FPSO against striking 
a supply vessel with displacement of 7,500 tonnes. The capacity 
of protection structures in view of strain energy is assessed 
with simple beam FE models. The striking vessel is modelled as 
a small rigid body and impact simulation is being performed 
including material and geometric nonlinearities, where ABAQUS/
EXPLICIT, which is a commercial explicit code, is used for non-
linear collision analyses with protection structures. Collision 
events of protectors of appurtenances (e.g. risers, mooring lines, 
and seawater lift caissons) with the supply vessel may cause 
structural damage on the protection structures, and even on the 
appurtenance structures and hull structures. Therefore, these 
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Table 1.
Levels of impact energies required for collision impact analyses of protectors.
protective structures should be designed to withstand accidental 
collision with the supply vessel.
2. FPSO VESSEL DESIGN
Single bottom and double side hull is designed as shown in 
Figure 1 with topsides weighing 32,300 tons. This has a refining 
capacity of 200,000 barrels of oil and 150 million cubic feet of 
gas a day, and a storage capacity of around 1.9 million barrels 
of crude oil. It has living quarters that can accommodate about 
150 employees. The FPSO is moored in a fixed position, and the 
suction piles and ground chain are linked. The facilities at the 
FPSO are planned for a service life of 20 years. The topside control 
system of FPSO is designed to suit 21 wells and a fourth subsea 
separation unit. Such subsea production lines, injection lines and 
risers to a spread moored the FPSO. 
The principle dimensions of FPSO are given as follows:
•	 Overall Length (L): 325.05 m,
•	 Length between perpendiculars (Lbp): 325.00 m,
•	 Moulded Breadth (B): 61.00 m,
•	 Moulded Depth (D): 32.00 m,
•	 Design Draft (Td): 24.58 m,
•	 Scantling Draft (Ts): 25.55 m,
•	 Block Coefficient for Scantling (Cb): 0.983.
Figure 1.
FPSO vessel general arrangement.
3. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF IMPACT ENERGY 
Impact energy to be considered in the protectors’ collision 
impact analyses is shown in Table 1. The locations considered in 














Accidental Energy absorbed by  plastic 
deformation (clearance 300 mm for 
riser only)
Bow 1 m/s Supply Vessel 7,500 t 4.2 MJ
Side 5.3 MJ
TRANSACTIONS ON MARITIME SCIENCE 133Trans. marit. sci. 2020; 02: 130-149
Figure 2.
Description of locations for collision impact analyses of the protectors.
Collisions on side shell and stern hull plating of the FPSO 
are assumed to be caused by a 7,500 ton supply vessel. The 
impact velocities are calculated as Eq.1.
(1)E = 0.5 ( M + Ad ) V ²   
M = striking vessel displacement (t)
Ad = Added mass (t)
V = Impact velocity (m/s)
A supply vessel with a displacement of 7,500t will be 
considered in the collision event with protection structures of 
appurtenances such as risers, mooring lines, and seawater lift 
caissons. The impact of the 7,500 ton supply vessel at the speed 
of 1m/s causes kinetic energy of 4.2MJ in bow/stern impact and 
5.3MJ in side on impact with an added mass factor of 10% and 
40% of the displacement of the colliding vessel respectively. 
The protection structures may be subjected to significant plastic 
deformation, but the risers (not other protected structures) 
should remain undamaged with a minimum clearance of 
300mm between the deformed protector and the risers. The 
other appurtenances should remain untouched during the 
deformation of protection structures.
The striking vessel is assumed to be a rigid body and this 
assumption is considered to give conservative results in view 
of safety. In addition, the FPSO is assumed not to move during 
collision events. The amount of kinetic energy absorbed to strain 
energy is required to be assessed as per NORSOK Standard, 
which allows energy dissipation by the movement of the struck 
vessel (FPSO). However, it is assumed that all the kinetic energy is 
absorbed to strain energy for the conservative approach. 
4. SCENARIOS FOR COLLISION IMPACT ANALYSES 
Various collision scenarios are taken into account in collision 
impact analyses. Three (3) vertical impact locations are selected 
considering depth and draught of typical supply vessel as well as 
FPSO’s operating drafts. During on site, FPSO may have various 
drafts between minimum draft of 11.19 m (normal operation) 
and maximum draft of 24.58 m (full draft).
A typical supply vessel has moulded depth of 8.0 m 
with draught of 6.5 m. This means that the bow end of the 
supply vessels is located 1.5 m above seawater level. The main 
dimensions of a typical supply vessel are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2.
Main dimensions of typical supply vessel.
Overall length 90.00 m
Length waterline 78.00 m
Overall beam 19.00 m
Moulded depth 8.00 m
Draught 6.50 m
Max. dead  weight 3,800 t
Light displacement 3,700 t
Loaded displacement 7,500 t
Cruise speed 12 knots
Max. speed 16 knots
Two different attack angles (0 / 90 degrees) were considered 
mainly in collision with protection structures to evaluate the 
protector itself and to obtain reaction forces that should be used 
for the design of support structures. Zero degree attack angle 
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Figure 3.
Vertical locations for collision impact analyses on protection structures (NORSOK N-004).
was accounted by supply vessel and was applied to mooring 
protectors and seawater lift caisson protectors on the vessel 
landing area (Zhang, 1999). In addition, the slanted parts of 
mooring protectors were considered to be impacted by supply 
vessel perpendicular to the protectors (about 42 degrees with 
FPSO). Table 3 summarizes collision scenarios to be considered.
Table 3.
Collision scenarios for the simulations.
Protection Structures
Riser Mooring Caisson
FPSO Draft Three drafts (full/mid/min.)
Collision Angle 90 degree 0/42/90 degrees 0/90 degrees
Note Side shell longitudinal stiffeners’ locations are considered
The proposed locations for collision impact analyses on 
protectors are illustrated in Figure 3, while Figure 4 illustrates the 
attack angles for collision on protector structures.
Detailed load cases for each protector are summarized in 
Table 4, and sketches of impact locations for the protectors are 
given in Figure 5 to Figure 8.
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Figure 4.
Attack angles for collision impact analyses on protection structures.
Table 4.
Detailed load cases for collision impact analyses.
Riser Protector
LC Impact angle Impacting vessel Approaching direction Energy to be absorbed
1 ~ 8 90 degree Supply vessel  
(7,500 t)
Bow 4.2 MJ
9 ~ 12 Side 5.3 MJ
Mooring Protectors
LC Impact angle Impacting vessel Approaching direction Energy to be absorbed
1 ~ 5 90 Supply vessel  
(7,500 t)
Bow 4.2 MJ
6 ~ 8 42
9 ~ 11 90 Side 5.3 MJ
12 ~ 14 42
15 0 Crew boat (478 t) Bow 0.263 MJ
Seawater Lift Caisson Protectors (PORT)
LC Impact angle Impacting vessel Approaching direction Energy to be absorbed
1 ~ 9 90 Supply vessel 
(7,500 t)
Bow 4.2 MJ
10 ~ 16 90 Side 5.3 MJ
17 0 Crew boat (478 t) Bow 0.263 MJ
Seawater Lift Caisson Protectors (STBD)
LC Impact angle Impacting vessel Approaching direction Energy to be absorbed
1 ~ 8 90 Supply vessel 
(7,500 t)
Bow 4.2 MJ
9 ~ 14 90 Side 5.3 MJ
15 0 Crew boat (478 t) Bow 0.263 MJ
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Figure 5.
Striking view simulated in finite element analyses.
Figure 6.
Load cases and impact locations for riser protector.
Bow collision was simulated by one (1) contact point 
instead of surface area, which might give severer results since it is 
certain that the bow of the striking vessel is blunt. Furthermore, 
even though the supply vessel has over 90m of beam, only two 
(2) vertical beams were taken into consideration. The striking 
views simulated in FEA are shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 8.
Load cases and impact locations for seawater lift caisson protectors (left: PORT Caisson Protector, and right: STBD Caisson 
Protector).
Figure 7.
Load cases and impact locations for mooring protectors (left: Aft Mooring Protector, and right: Forward Mooring Protector).
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5. RUPTURE STRAIN AND MATERIAL PROPERTY
The amount of kinetic energy absorbed as strain energy 
must be assessed in accordance with the NORSOK standard. It 
is presumed, however, that all of kinetic energy is consumed in 
a conservative way to rupture strain. The percentage of rupture 
strain is also determined depending on the grade of steel, as 
shown in Table 5 below, as per the NORSOK Standard. Interpolation 
calculated the percentage of rupture strain for the grade of steel 
that is not specified in the table. In addition, material properties 
used in collision analysis are depicted in Table 6.
Table 5.
Proposed values of εcr for different steel grades by NORSOK.





Material properties to be used in non-linear F.E. analyses (DNVGL-RP-C208).
Steel Grade Mild HT 32 HT 36
Yield stress 235 MPa 315 MPa 355 MPa
Elastic strain 0.20% 0.20% 0.20%
Ultimate tensile stress 450 MPa 530 MPa 560 MPa
Critical failure strain 20.0% 16.7% 15.0%
Density 7,850 kg/m3 7,850 kg/m3 7,850 kg/m3
Young’s modulus 2.06e+11 N/m2 2.06e+11 N/m2 2.06e+11 N/m2
Poison’s ratio 0.3 0.3 0.3
Tangent modulus 1,085 MPa 1,303 MPa 1,385 MPa
Hardening parameter 1.0 1.0 1.0
Strain rate (C) 40.4 3200 3200
Strain rate (P) 5.0 5.0 5.0
6. ASSESSMENT METHOD
In this study, FE analyses focus on the assessment of a 
multitude of possible scenarios of ship collision and structural 
configurations to be analysed. An FE analysis is the most flexible 
method and can account for possible effects occurring as well 
as be used to assess the relevant factors such as impact energy, 
boundary conditions, material, and discrete indenter shape, and 
stiffness and indentation location. Assessing non-linear material 
behaviour is essential when determining the response of a 
structure. 
The properties of the elastic-plastic materials should be 
described by application:
•	 An initial yield criterion; 
•	 A hardening rule where the yield condition is modified due 
to the history of plastic flow; 
•	 A flow rule that updates the plastic stiffness using an 
incremental stress-strain relationship.  
•	 The explicit method of analysis for the FE has the following 
properties:
•	 Can manage very low dynamic response times, allowing 
highly discontinuous processes for large models;
•	 Allows for large deformations and rotations; 
•	 It can analyse assembled parts with very general contact 
definitions; 
•	 A linear geometrical deformation theory can be employed 
if small deformations and rotations are presumed; 
•	 Adiabatic stress analysis may be used if heat generation is 
assumed to be associated with inelastic dissipation;
•	 Allows for quasi-static analysis of models with complex 
contact definitions; 
•	 Allows the deletion of the element to the rupture model.
To check the strength of the structures against collision 
impact, explicit nonlinear FE simulations are carried out, 
including large deformation of structures and the properties 
of elastoplastic material. Strain hardening effect together with 
ultimate stress is accounted for nonlinear FE simulations as a bi-
linear strain-stress curve based on material grades as shown in 
Figure 9 and Figure 10. The fracture was determined on the basis 
of the critical plastic strain of the material used in accordance 
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with the NORSOK standard. Figure 11 shows the properties of the 
material used in non-linear simulation. Ultimate stress data are 
average values and critical strain data are based on the NORSOK 
standard. The Cowper-Symonds rate enhancement formula 
is employed to account for the effect of strain rate on material 
properties as given in Eq.2, Eq.3 and Eq.4 that are shown in Figure 
9 and Figure 10. 
εy εf
Figure 9.




Stress-strain curves for different steel grades.








= 1 + {      } 1/qσyd ε
σy D
(4)
σy = Yield stress
Eh = Hardening modulus
σp , εp = Plastic stress and Plastic strain
E = Young’s modulus
Mild steel:             D=40.4, q=5
HT steel       D=3200,  q=5
It is noted that σyd is the dynamic yield stress; σy is the 
static yield stress. The material properties given to the initial 
configuration are in accordance with the steel quality used for 
the FPSO vessel. This included steel grades Mild, HT32 and HT36 
as per DNVGL-RP-C208 (2019). 
Collision simulation, including material and geometric 
nonlinearities, was performed using ABAQUS Explicit tool. To 
determine the strength capacity of hull plating for the supply 
vessel and oil tanker against collision events, advanced non-
linear FE simulation is performed because complex responses 
are caused by these collision events. Element properties applied 
in the FE models are produced by deducting full of DNVGL Ship 
Rules corrosion addition from rule gross scantling according to 
DNVGL Ship Rules Part 3, Chapter 1 requirement (2019).
7. FINITE ELEMENT (FE) MODELS
The capacity of protection structures in view of strain 
energy has been assessed with simple beam FE models. Due 
to the simplicity of structures, ABAQUS Explicit code has been 
employed for the collision simulation with protection structures. 
FE models of riser protector, aft mooring protector, forward 
(FWD) mooring protector, port caisson, starboard (STBD) caisson 
with bow and side impact rigid models are shown in Figures 12 
to 21. 
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Figure 12.
FE model of riser protector and side impact rigid model.
Figure 14.
FE model of FWD mooring protector and side impact rigid 
model.
Figure 15.
FE model of PORT  caisson protector and bow impact rigid 
model.
Figure 13.
FE model of AFT  mooring protector and bow impact rigid 
model.
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Figure 16.
FE model of STBD caisson protector and side impact rigid 
model.
Figure 17.
Clamp and riser guard of riser protector (Upper and Lower Support).
8. BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
Boundary condition of each protector has been set 
according to the connection mechanism of protectors to the 
supporting structures.
For riser protectors, riser guard is clamped to 4 supports (2 
at upper and 2 at lower), which are welded to the hull. Clamps 
are provided with elastometric pads and allow small rotation, 
as shown in Figure 17. In a practical approach, stiffness of the 
hull and stiffness of the clamp system have not been taken 
into account: upper supports are considered pinned and lower 
supports guided. For instance, if the upper support is assumed 
with pinned boundary, it is certain that the lower support does 
not react to lateral behaviour because the angular deformation is 
completely restricted at upper structure. The expected shape of 
protector during collision may be given as in Figure 17.
For mooring protectors and seawater lift caisson protectors, 
protectors are welded to supports which are also welded to 
hull. Hence, all the supporting locations are considered as fixed 
boundary, both in translational and rotational directions. The 
boundary conditions of supports are summarised in Table 7, and 
the sketch of each protector is shown in Figure 18.
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Figure 18.
Boundary conditions of protectors.
Table 7.
Boundary conditions of each protector.
Protectors Riser protector Mooring / Caisson protector
Supports Upper supports Lower supports All supports
Translation UX=UY=UZ=0 UX=UZ=0, UY=FREE UX=UY=UZ=0
Rotation RX=RY=RZ=FREE RX=RY=RZ=0
Note: x is longitudinal direction  
y is vertical direction 
z is transversal direction
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9. FINITE ELEMENT SIMULATION
Collision events are simulated by giving initial speed of 1.0 
m/s to the rigid body, which represents colliding supply vessel. 
The mass of the rigid body varies according to the colliding 
directions (bow/side-on) with corresponding added mass 
coefficients. 
 During the collision the surface contact between the 
supply vessel and the protector is taken into consideration. An 
infinite coefficient of friction is used during contact phenomenon 
because it is considered a conservative approach to allow no 
slip at the contact point. The contact was defined by beam-to-
surface in ABAQUS. Self-contact which may occur due to large 
deformation of protector is allowed, but no self-contact occurred.
10. LOCAL DENTING EFFECT
For local denting on the pipe surface due to the ship 
collision, it may be necessary to estimate the reaction force 
from the striking vessel (NORSOK standard N-004). The response 
of a beam subjected to a collision load is initially governed by 
bending, which is affected by and interacts with local denting 
under the load. The bending capacity is also reduced if local 
buckling takes place on the compression side. As the beam 
undergoes finite deformations, the load carrying capacity may 
increase considerably due to the development of membrane 
tension forces. This depends upon the ability of adjacent 
structure to restrain the connections at the member ends to 
inward displacements. Provided that the connections do not fail, 
the energy dissipation capacity is either limited by tension failure 
of the member or rupture of the connection.
Obviously, the bow collision might affect more the denting 
phenomenon on the surface rather than side directional collision. 
The local denting was looked into by considering a collision 
on the middle of the span of riser protector, which was chosen 
as an example for knowing how a certain level of denting may 
take place on the tube. Load Condition (LC2) is accounted for a 
colliding event by supply vessel’s bow. 
From the FE results, the reaction force of 342 kN was 
calculated and compared to the critical resistance as per NORSOK 
Standard “N-004, Design of Steel Structures”. 
The critical resistance can be calculated to 279 kN, so the 
ratio of resistances is 1.22 (=342kN / 279kN). In accordance with 
the NORSOK N-004 code, the denting depth due to bow collision 
is required to be no more than 0.01D. Thus, considering the outer 
diameter of 450 mm, the denting depth is merely 4.5 mm, which 
would be negligible in the reduction of moment capacity due to 
local denting, which is referred to in Figures 19 and 20, according 
to NORSOK N-004. Finally, the effect of local denting from ship 
collision is not taken into account here.
Figure 19.
Resistance curve for local denting.
Figure 20.
Reduction of Moment Capacity due to local dent.
11. FINITE ELEMENT (FE) RESULTS 
For all the impact load cases, the following results are 
provided: 
•	 The maximum plastic strain and the maximum deflection, 
•	 The maximum/minimum reactions at supports, 
•	 Estimated acceleration of FPSO due to collision events on 
riser protector, 
•	 Plots of deformed shape and plastic strain contour, 
•	 graph containing kinetic energy and absorbed internal 
energy. 
The maximum plastic strain and deflection results are 
summarized in Table 8.
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Table 8.
Summary of result data on maximum plastic strain and deflection.
Table 9.
Summary of maximum deflection for protectors.
Protectors type Plastic strain (%) Deflection (meters)
Max. Results Criteria Max. Results Criteria Margin**
Riser 4.12 15 2.124 300  mm  clearance 
to risers
0.321





FWD mooring 7.75 15 1.341 0.500
1.102 * 0.176
PORT caisson 7.82 15 1.051 1.524
STBD caisson 7.99 15 1.049 1.574
The results show that all the protectors sustain plastic strain 
of less than 8 %, which is about half of the critical plastic strain. 
This means that all the protectors sustain excessive stress of yield 
and deform permanently due to the accidental collision events 
by a supply vessel; however, they do not fail. The maximum 
deflection of the riser protector is 2.124 m, which is a sufficient 
margin considering the design criteria of 300 mm clearance to 
the risers. 
The mooring protectors deform up to 1.282 m and 1.341 
m at the parallel part of AFT and FWD mooring protector 
respectively. The results also show that the slanted parts of 
protectors in the way of No.3 stringer have not been contacted 
by mooring chain stoppers including related structures. 
The maximum deflections of 1.051 m and 1.049 m for each 
PORT and STBD caisson protector show that collision events due 
to a supply vessel do not cause any contact between protectors 
and seawater lift caissons. Table 9 gives the summarized 
maximum deflections for each protector. 
Reactions on the supports are obtained to be used as 
design loads of supporting structures of the appurtenances. To 
check whether the resultant acceleration of the FPSO due to the 
collision events on riser protector by a supply vessel affects the 
design basis of topside structures, the resultant translational 
acceleration of FPSO is estimated as following way:
Step 1. The maximum sum of reactions at the supports due 
to the collision on riser protector is calculated as 5,990 kN. 
Protector Colliding Load  Case Deflection [m]
Risers Bow LC1 1.682
Side LC10 1.071
AFT Mooring Bow LC1 1.110
Side LC9 1.282
FWD Mooring Bow LC1 1.206
Side LC9 1.341
PORT Caisson Bow LC6 0.933
Side LC13 1.051
STBD Caisson Bow LC3 0.968
Side LC9 1.049
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Table 10.
Summary of design loads for protector’s foundation.
Step 2. The minimum displacement of FPSO is 147,825 tons 
at the loading No. 1101 – normal towing condition. 
Step 3. The lateral acceleration is estimated with the 
assumption that the FPSO will behave as a rigid body: F/m = 
5,990 kN / 147,825 = 0.0405 m/s = 0.004g. 
Finally, there is no need for concern about the additional 
effect of topsides due to the ship’s collision-induced inertia 
because the induced inertia is too low in comparison with the 
design lateral acceleration.
Buckling may be concerned at the ship collision in the way 
of the support member giving very high reaction into the hull 
structure; so, LC10 of the protector of PORT Seawater Lift Caisson 
was chosen as a critical loading case.
From the FE results, the member in the way of the impact 
had the sectional force of 140 kN and the bending moment of 
640KN-m at the load case. The evaluation was done based on 
AISC Code (2001). Boundary condition was assumed to both ends 
fixed. Considering the scantling of member of Outer Diameter 
(OD) 550 x 30, the permissible force was calculated to around 
1,000 kN, in which the unity check value was only 0.32 (i.e. <1.0) 
for accidental design factor of 1.0 (i.e. σall = 1.0 σy). Finally, the 
buckling is not the matter of concern. The collision was a side-on 
event, which concerns only two (2) members.
12. KINETIC ENERGY AND INTERNAL ENERGY
To check whether the collision simulations are carried 
out properly, the kinetic energy of the supply vessel and the 
absorbed internal energy of the protectors are plotted based 
on time. Most cases show that the kinetic energy starts from the 
required energy level, and the internal energy increases up to the 
required energy level. These results reveal that the loadings are 
properly applied and the simulations are carried out reasonably.
Some cases show that the kinetic energy is not reduced 
to zero and, hence, the internal energy does not absorb the 
required energy level. The reason may be that the structure 
is so stiff that the striking body is bounded before its kinetic 
energy is consumed. The crew boat collision events show this 
phenomenon.
The detailed results about the energy level change for all 
the load cases are shown in Figures 21 to 26. Design loads for the 
foundation of protectors are summarized in Table 10.
Item Fx Fy Fz Rx Ry Rz
min max min max min max min max min max min max
Risers -2,640 2,630 -4,010 813 -2,220 5,700 - - - - - -
AFT Mooring -3,280 4,340 -1,370 1,180 -1,220 9,950 -2,320 2,860 -5,800 4,900 -1,790 1,710
FWD Mooring -2,610 2,610 -1,070 1,110 -6,530 4,610 -2,460 2,520 -4,090 4,330 -9,450 6,540
PORT Caisson -5,120 1,770 -1,070 1,030 -1,610 13,400 -3,030 3,080 -8,570 4,730 -289 348
STBD Caisson -3,540 1,360 -696 619 -1,190 5,830 -1,500 1,530 -6,150 3,850 -203 253
(Unit : kN, kN-m)
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Figure 21.
Results of LC 1 of riser protector (plastic strain, deflection, energy levels).
Figure 22.
Results of LC 10 of riser protector (plastic strain, deflection, energy levels).
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Figure 23.
Results of LC 7 of FWD mooring protector (plastic strain, deflection, energy levels).
Figure 24.
Results of LC 10 of FWD mooring protector (plastic strain, deflection, energy levels).
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Figure 25.
Results of LC 2 of PORT seawater lift caisson protector (plastic strain, deflection, energy levels).
Figure 26.
Results of LC 4 of STBD seawater lift caisson protector (plastic strain, deflection, energy levels).
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13. CONCLUSION
Caissons for seawater lift and discharge are normally 
positioned on the side shell structure. The design should 
consider the handling requirements for installation, and on-
site deployment and maintenance. On the other hand, external 
vertical caissons fitted with strainer and submerged lift pump 
for seawater intake, running along the side shell are used. These 
external vertical caissons should be protected against collision 
and designed for an easy maintenance.
The collision impact analysis shows that while some parts 
of the protective parts are permanently deformed by collision 
events, there is no failure based on the NORSOK standard plastic 
strain criteria in which the critical plastic strain for HT36 steel 
grade is specified as 15%.
Bow collision is being simulated by one (1) contact point 
instead of a surface area, which might produce severer results 
since it is certain that the bow of the striking vessel is blunt. 
Furthermore, even though the supply vessel has a beam of over 
90m, only two (2) vertical beams are taken into consideration, 
which is also very conservative.
The maximum deflections were checked, and no contact 
was found between the protectors and the protected structures. 
To verify if the collision simulations are performed correctly, 
the supply vessel's kinetic energy and the protector's absorbed 
internal energy were tested during collision events. In most 
cases, the absorbed internal energy arises to the required energy 
level, but in some cases all the kinetic energies are not consumed 
during collision events due to the relatively high protector 
rigidity. 
The maximum deflection of the riser protector is 2.124 m, 
which is aa sufficient margin considering the design criteria of 
300 mm clearance to the risers. 
The mooring protectors deform up to 1.282 m and 1.341 
m at the parallel part of AFT and FWD mooring protectors 
respectively. The results also show that the slanted parts of 
protectors in the way of No.3 stringer have not been contacted 
with mooring chain stoppers including related structures. 
The maximum deflections of 1.051 m and 1.049 m for each 
PORT and STBD caisson protector show that the collision events 
due to the supply vessel do not cause any contact between 
protectors and seawater lift caissons. 
These results show that the loadings have been properly 
applied and the simulations have been carried out reasonably. 
As such, the findings of this research should be informative in the 
safe design of FPSO units.
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